The optimal contest architecture for symmetric imperfectly discriminating contests is shown to be generically the two-stage tournament (rather than the one-stage contest). In the first stage the contestants compete in several parallel divisions for the right to participate in the second stage. In the second stage the short-listed finalists compete for the prize. Given a sufficient number of contestants, the two-stage tournament is either strictly better or at least as good as the one-stage contest for maximizing an individual's effort, for maximizing the aggregate effort and for minimizing the standard deviation of effort. For maximizing an individual's effort it is generally optimal to have only two finalists in the second stage. For maximizing the aggregate effort or minimizing the standard deviation of effort the optimal number of finalists in the second stage depends on the discriminating power of the contest success function.
Introduction
A contest is a competition where the contestants simultaneously contribute effort to win a prize. In perfectly discriminating contests (e.g. Moldovanu and Sela 2001 ) the highest contributed effort secures a win (like in an all-pay auction). In imperfectly discriminating contests (e.g. Dixit 1987 ) the highest contributed effort has the highest probability of a win but it does not necessarily secure a win. Imperfectly discriminating contests are extensively used to study sport competitions (e.g. Szymanski 2003) , political rent-seeking (e.g. Nitzan 1991 Nitzan , 1994 , research and development and patent races (e.g. Nti 1997 ), labor incentives (e.g. Rosen 1986 ) etc.
In this paper I study the architecture of symmetric imperfectly discriminating contests.
Casual evidence suggests that the one-stage contest is rarely organized (e.g. Amegashie 1999 ).
Common practice instead is a two-stage tournament. In the first stage the contestants are grouped into several divisions where they compete for the right to participate in the second stage. In the second stage the contestants who won the first stage compete for the final prize. I will examine whether such a two-stage tournament is beneficial for the organizers who wish to maximize an individual's effort, to maximize the aggregate effort or to minimize the standard deviation of contributed effort. This paper is related to Gradstein and Konrad (1999) and Amegashie (1999) who studied the optimal architecture of symmetric imperfectly discriminating contests when the organizers want to maximize or minimize the aggregate (rent-seeking) effort. Moldovanu and Sela (2004) analyzed the optimal architecture of asymmetric perfectly discriminating contests.
However, all above mentioned papers considered only a symmetric Nash equilibrium. In this paper I analyze the complete structure of equilibria including asymmetric equilibria (e.g. Perez-
Castrillo and Verdier 1992).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The one-stage contest (so called Tullock (1980) contest) is described in section two. The two-stage tournament is described in section three. These two contest architectures are examined in section four according to three criteria: maximum individual effort, maximum aggregate effort and minimum standard deviation of effort. Section five concludes. Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998) . 0 > r is the discriminating power of the contest success function. When +∞ → r the imperfectly discriminating contest converges to the perfectly discriminating one. In the standard Tullock (1980) contest the contestants are assumed to be risk neutral with linear cost of effort. Kai and Schlesinger (1997) studied imperfectly discriminating contests with risk averse contestants and found that risk aversion has an indeterminate effect on the contributed effort. Moldovanu and Sela (2004) studied perfectly discriminating contests with convex cost of effort and found that the benefits of two-stage tournaments increase in the degree of convexity of a cost function.
One-stage contest
Each contestant maximizes the net expected value of his or her contributed effort (1).
[ ] (1) 1 The technology that translates an individual's effort into the probability of winning is called the contest success function (e.g. Szymanski 2003 ).
The solution of problem (1) Perez-Castrillo and Verdier (1992) and Cleeton (1989) discussed the asymmetric Nash equilibria in the Tullock (1980) contest. Baye and Shin (1999) and Perez-Castrillo and Verdier (1992) analyzed the Stackelberg equilibrium in the Tullock (1980) contest.
The intuitive explanation of equilibrium structure from table 1 is as follows. In poorly discriminating contests (when
) all contestants actively participate in the contest (i.e.
they contribute positive effort) because there is a possibility to win a prize (almost by chance)
while contributing low effort. In moderately discriminating contests (when ( ) 
. Therefore, the right for participation in the second stage yields an ex ante payoff 1 V . The first-stage divisional contest is then equivalent to the one-stage contest described in section two with f n contestants and a prize 1 V (e.g. Amegashie 1999).
Comparative statics
The contests' organizers (here onwards the organizers) may have three different objectives: to maximize an individual's effort, to maximize the aggregate effort, or to minimize the standard deviation of the contestants' effort. In other words, the organizers may wish to observe the highest winning effort (the breaking of a world record), to maintain the overall quality of the contest, or to foster a close contest (a competitive balance) resulting in a thrilling competition (e.g. Szymanski 2003 Szymanski , p. 1143 .
Maximum individual effort
Suppose that the organizers want to maximize an individual's effort contributed in the two-stage tournament. In poorly discriminating contests (when
) all contestants actively participate in the first stage and all short-listed contestants actively participate in the second stage ( f k = ). Consequently, the symmetric Nash equilibrium exists in both stages. In the second stage each contestant contributes effort
, which follows from the second row of table 1. In the first stage each contestant contributes effort (2) is
In poorly discriminating contests (when
) the number of active contestants in the first (second) stage f n l = ( f k = ) was exogenously determined by the organizers. In moderately discriminating contests (when ( )
) the asymmetric Nash equilibria may arise endogenously in the two-stage tournament. The organizers face an additional constraintthey cannot assign more active contestants to a single stage of the tournament than the endogenous limit of
. This constraint is formalized in the second line of equation (2).
The unique solution of problem (2) is 2 = f which coincides with the optimal architecture under the symmetric Nash equilibrium. Intuitively, the endogenous constraint on the maximum number of active contestants is not binding for the organizers who would always prefer to have a minimum number of active contestants in the second stage. 
Maximum aggregate effort
Suppose that the organizers want to maximize the aggregate effort contributed in the twostage tournament. In poorly discriminating contests (when
) the symmetric Nash equilibrium exists in both stages. We already established that in the second stage f contestants then contribute effort
each. In the first stage n contestants contribute effort
each. The problem of the organizers who want to maximize an aggregate effort is then given by equation (3).
The straightforward maximization of problem (3) yields a solution n f = when 1 < r and n f = when 1 > r . In a special case when 1 = r the aggregate effort contributed in the contest does not depend on the contest architecture (e.g. Gradstein and Konrad 1999 Gradstein and Konrad (1999) demonstrated that when 1 < r the optimal architecture is a knock-out tournament (a series of pairwise contests). In other words, the optimal number of contestants in each stage should be minimum 
Minimum standard deviation of effort
Suppose that the organizers want to minimize the standard deviation of effort contributed in the two-stage tournament. In poorly discriminating contests (when
) the symmetric Nash equilibrium exists in both stages. In each stage every participating contestant contributes the same effort as the others. The standard deviation of contributed effort is zero (at its minimum). Therefore, any contest architecture yields minimum standard deviation of effort.
If the one-stage contest is organized when ( ) Additionally, if the number f n of the contestants who participate in the first-stage divisional contest is less than
, the standard deviation of effort in the first stage is then zero as well. Therefore, any two-stage tournament with
minimizes the standard deviation of contributed effort. Such a tournament is feasible when
which implies a restriction on the discriminating power of the contest success function
there is no two-stage tournament that can reduce the standard deviation of effort to zero in both stages. In the second stage the standard deviation of effort is More generally, any two-stage tournament with
correspondingly dominated by the two-stage tournament with
). Additionally, the tournament with Table 2 The optimal architecture of imperfectly discriminating contests with n contestants (in the two-stage tournament f short-listed contestants compete in the second stage) The main theoretical result of this paper is the following. In symmetric imperfectly discriminating contests the optimal contest architecture is generically the two-stage tournament.
Conclusion
Given a sufficient number of contestants, the two-stage tournament is either strictly better or at least as good as the one-stage contest for maximizing an individual's effort, for maximizing the aggregate effort and for minimizing the standard deviation of effort. Only on one instance when the discriminating power r of the contest success function is between unity and ( ) 1 − n n the onestage contest is an optimal architecture for maximizing the aggregate effort. However, when the number of contestants is very large the probability that ( ) ( ] 1 , 1 − ∈ n n r converges to zero.
When the organizers want to maximize an individual's effort the optimal architecture is generically the two-stage tournament with only two contestants in the second stage. Moldovanu and Sela (2004) obtained the same result for perfectly discriminating contests. When the organizers want to maximize the aggregate effort contributed in the contest or to minimize the standard deviation of effort, the optimal number of finalists in the second stage depends on the discriminating power of the contest success function. In moderately discriminating contests (when ( ) 2 1 ≤ < − r n n ) the optimal architecture for maximizing the aggregate effort (minimizing the standard deviation of effort) is generically the following. The two-stage tournament should be organized with such a number of finalists in the second stage that if one more contestant is allowed to participate in the second stage he or she would optimally not use this right.
Interestingly, in highly discriminating contests (when 2 > r ) the optimal architecture for maximizing the aggregate effort is any two-stage tournament. It does not matter how many finalists are admitted to the second stage. Only the fact that there are two stages in the tournament is sufficient to maximize the aggregate effort contributed in the competition. This result contrasts with the finding in Moldovanu and Sela (2004) that the one-stage contest is optimal for maximizing the aggregate effort in perfectly discriminating contests (that may be thought of as a limiting case of highly discriminating contests).
In this paper the analysis was restricted to the tournament that has only two stages, which is common in the literature on contest architecture (e.g. Sela 2004, Amegashie 1999) . A natural extension of this work is to make the number of stages in the tournament a policy variable for the organizers. It would be interesting to explore under which conditions the multi-stage tournaments are preferred to the two-stage tournament and the one-stage contest. In the two-stage tournament, as modeled in this paper, only one contestant was promoted from each first stage division to the second stage. However, in many real life competitions several top ranked contestants are promoted from each sub-division to the next stage. It would be interesting to explore if the promotion of several top ranked contestants is optimal.
